For instructors

Teaching notes

Governments sell spectrum and mining leases by auction, firms win contracts through sealed tenders, and advertising space is sold in millions of small auctions every hour. The rules differ from case to case, and a bidder's best strategy depends on the rules.

What the game shows

The game tests how people bid under different rules and whether formats that the theory treats as equivalent produce the same prices. With private values it shows bid shading, the dominant strategy of the second-price auction and the revenue equivalence of the standard formats. With a common value it shows the winner's curse. The all-pay and dollar auctions show escalation, in which bidders together pay more than the item is worth.

The theory

Vickrey (1961) showed that in a second-price sealed-bid auction it is a dominant strategy to bid one's value, and that the English auction leads to the same outcome, since a bidder stays in until the price reaches that value. In a first-price auction bidders shade their bids below their values, and with values drawn uniformly a bidder who cares about expected earnings bids the lowest possible value plus the fraction of the distance to the own value given by the number of bidders minus one over the number of bidders. The Dutch auction presents the same decision as the first-price auction.

The revenue equivalence theorem, due to Myerson (1981) and to Riley and Samuelson (1981), states that all these formats, and the all-pay auction too, yield the same expected revenue when values are private and independent and bidders are neutral toward risk. When the value is common and each bidder holds a noisy signal, the highest signal tends to win, so a bidder must reduce the bid to allow for what winning implies. Milgrom and Weber (1982) give the general theory, and Capen, Clapp and Campbell (1971) described the problem from experience of bidding for oil leases. The dollar auction of Shubik (1971), in which the runner-up also pays, turns each further bid into a comparison with a loss already incurred.

What to expect

Bids in first-price auctions are generally above the benchmark for bidders who are neutral toward risk, a pattern that Cox, Smith and Walker (1988) relate to risk aversion. The equivalences between formats fail in a consistent direction, beginning with the finding of Coppinger, Smith and Titus (1980) that prices in Dutch auctions were about 5 percent below those in first-price auctions. In second-price auctions, Kagel and Levin (1993) found 62 percent of bids above the bidder's value and 30 percent at it, whereas Kagel, Harstad and Levin (1987) observed that prices in English auctions moved quickly to the level that the dominant strategy implies.

The winner's curse appears reliably when the value is common, and Bazerman and Samuelson (1983) document it with items worth 8 dollars sold in 48 classroom auctions. The average estimate of the value was $5.13 and the average winning bid $10.01, so that the average winner lost about two dollars. Kagel and Levin (1986) found that experienced bidders earned profits in groups of three or four and made losses in groups of six or seven. In the all-pay auctions of Gneezy and Smorodinsky (2006), the seller's revenue was commonly between two and three times the value of the prize.

Tips and things to look out for

References