Guessing Game
Each player picks a number, and the target is a fraction of the class average. Points depend on the distance from the target, so the game can be repeated and the convergence of guesses tracked round by round.
Games and experiments for teaching economics and game theory
A growing portfolio of configurable classroom games for economics and game theory courses. Students join from any phone or laptop with a session code. The instructor sets the rules, observes every decision as it arrives, and exports the full record afterwards.
Nineteen games, each with adjustable rules. More are added as they are built.
Each player picks a number, and the target is a fraction of the class average. Points depend on the distance from the target, so the game can be repeated and the convergence of guesses tracked round by round.
The traveler’s dilemma, the 11–20 money request game, and the minimum effort game. Each player names a number, and the payoff depends on how it compares with the others’.
The whole class answers the same question without talking, and each student scores by matching the others. The questions are the instructor’s to write.
Each member of a group draws a private signal about a hidden urn and predicts the urn in public, one after another. Later members may find it wise to ignore their own signal.
Pairs choose between two actions at the same time, round after round, with the same partner or a new one each round. Payoffs are adjustable, with presets for the stag hunt and chicken, and partners can chat.
Any two-player game in strategic form with up to four actions each. Enter your own payoff table or start from matching pennies, the battle of the sexes, hawk and dove, an entry game, or rock, paper, scissors.
The ultimatum game, the dictator game, and alternating offers over a shrinking pie. Pairs play move by move, and every offer and response is recorded.
An investor sends money that is multiplied on the way, and a trustee decides how much to return. A gift-exchange variant pairs an employer’s wage with a worker’s effort.
A sender who knows the own type chooses a message, and a receiver who sees only the message answers. Presets cover beer and quiche and job-market signaling, and every payoff can be changed.
Two players take turns to take the larger of two growing piles or to pass the decision on. The number of nodes, the piles and their growth are adjustable.
Members of a group divide an endowment between themselves and a common pot that is multiplied and shared. Options add a threshold that the pot must reach, or a stage of costly punishment.
The members of a group share a fishing ground. Each hour on the lake pays less the more the group fishes, so the group does best with a restraint that no member has reason to show.
Members of a group spend resources to win a prize. A larger outlay improves the chance of winning, and whatever is spent is lost. The host page shows how much of the prize is dissipated.
Everybody answers yes or no at once. A market has room for only some entrants, or one volunteer is enough and each member hopes that it is somebody else.
Depositors of a common bank choose to withdraw early or to wait. Waiting pays more unless too many others withdraw. Bank size and payments are adjustable.
Firms in a market compete in quantities or in prices, with Cournot, Stackelberg, and Bertrand competition for identical or differentiated products. Each firm has a profit calculator.
Buyers and sellers with private values and costs trade in a live market by posting bids and asks. The host page sets the prices against the supply and demand that the values induce.
First-price, second-price, English, Dutch, all-pay and dollar auctions, with private values, a common value with private signals, or a value known to all. The host page plots bids against values with the equilibrium benchmark.
A seller knows the quality of a car and the buyer does not. Students bid against a computer seller or trade in pairs, and the host page shows which cars change hands.
When none of the games fits a question, an instructor can design an experiment of their own. The builder describes who plays and in what groups, which roles exist, what each role decides in each stage, which numbers are drawn at random, and how points are computed from a formula. An experiment can be tested with random decisions before it reaches a class, and it then runs like any other game, with own pace, live charts on the host page and the full record for export.
Experiments are kept in the instructor's account and are visible only there. A link lets a colleague save a copy in an own account. The builder starts from a blank page or from worked examples, among them an ultimatum game, a public goods game with punishment, a first-price auction with private values, a beauty contest for the whole class and a price list for measuring risk preferences.
Register once, choose a game, state the class size, and adjust the rules. Each session receives its own six-character code.
Students join with the code or a QR scan. The instructor opens and ends each round, sees who has responded, reads any partner chat, and can project the results.
Every decision is saved and can be downloaded as a CSV file at any time during or after the session.
Students do not create accounts. A session stores only the name, the optional ID that the instructor asks for, the decisions made in the game, and any chat messages, which the instructor can read. Session data are kept for six months from the day the session is created and are then deleted automatically. An instructor can delete a session earlier from the dashboard.