On a commodity exchange, buyers and sellers call out prices and trade whenever two of them agree. No participant knows what the others would be willing to pay or accept, and nobody sets the price. The double auction market places a class in that position.
The game tests the central claim of price theory, that a market of self-interested traders with private information reaches the price and quantity at which supply equals demand. It shows price discovery as a process, measures how much of the possible gain from trade a market captures, and, with a ceiling or floor, shows what a price control costs. For many students it is the first time the supply and demand diagram describes something they have done.
Each buyer is given a value and each seller a cost, and earnings are the difference between that number and the price. By choosing these numbers the instructor fixes the demand and supply schedules, a method set out by Smith (1976) as induced value theory. The competitive equilibrium is the price at which the number of buyers with higher values equals the number of sellers with lower costs. At that price all trades that create a gain take place, and no others.
Whether a market finds that price is a separate question, since no trader knows the schedules. Hayek (1945) argued that the price system makes use of knowledge that no single person holds. The experiments on this page are the test of that argument, and the competitive model itself says nothing about how the price is reached.
The first classroom markets, run by Chamberlin (1948) with students bargaining in pairs around the room, did not reach the equilibrium. The number of trades exceeded the competitive quantity in 42 of his 46 sessions and was never below it, and the average price was usually below the competitive price. Smith (1962) changed the institution so that all bids and asks were public and repeated the market over several periods with the same values. Prices then moved to the competitive level within a few periods, in groups of ordinary class size.
The institution itself accounts for much of the result, as Gode and Sunder (1993) showed when they replaced the human traders with programs that bid at random, subject only to the rule that no trade may lose money. These markets captured between 97 and 100 percent of the possible gains from trade. In a classroom the first round usually shows prices scattered over a wide range, and later rounds show a narrowing toward the equilibrium. Isaac and Plott (1981) study price ceilings and floors in such markets, and Holt (1996) describes a version for the classroom that needs no computers.