For instructors

Teaching notes

Two airlines on the same route would both earn more with high fares, yet each gains by undercutting the other. Members of a cartel agree on quotas and each is tempted to exceed its own. In both cases the outcome that is best for the pair is not what either side would choose alone.

What the game shows

The game tests how much cooperation survives when defection is individually profitable, and what repetition, a known final round, communication and anonymity do to it. With the presets for the stag hunt and for chicken, the same screen also shows coordination problems, in which the difficulty is trust or precedence and no dominant strategy exists.

The theory

In a single round defection is a dominant strategy, and mutual defection is the unique Nash equilibrium although both players prefer mutual cooperation. The first experiment with this structure was run at RAND in 1950 and is reported in Flood (1958). When the number of rounds is known, backward induction extends the argument to every round, since defection in the last round removes the reason to cooperate in the round before.

Two lines of theory explain why cooperation is nevertheless common. Kreps et al. (1982) show that a small doubt about whether the partner is strictly self-interested makes it rational to cooperate until close to the end. When the horizon is indefinite, cooperation can be sustained as an equilibrium by strategies that answer defection with defection, provided that the future matters enough, and Axelrod and Hamilton (1981) made reciprocal strategies of this kind widely known. In the stag hunt both common choices are equilibria, one better for both players and the other safer, a tension studied by Cooper et al. (1990) and by Battalio, Samuelson and Van Huyck (2001).

What to expect

Across the experiments reviewed by Sally (1995), participants cooperated in a little under half of their choices, and the opportunity to talk raised cooperation substantially. Andreoni and Miller (1993) found that players who kept the same partner for ten rounds cooperated significantly more than players who met a new partner in every round, which is what reputation building predicts.

Within a game of known length, cooperation is common in the early rounds and collapses near the end. Embrey, Fréchette and Yuksel (2018) show that the payoffs and the horizon determine how much cooperation forms at the start, and that with experience the first defection moves earlier, although this unraveling can be very slow. For indefinite horizons, Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011) report that cooperation fell to about 5 percent where it was not an equilibrium, and that it rose on average, though not in every session, where it was an equilibrium and also risk dominant.

Tips and things to look out for

References