For instructors

Teaching notes

Two travelers lose identical suitcases, and the airline asks each to name the value separately. A consultant decides how much to bill, knowing that slightly undercutting a rival wins the next contract. A project team finishes only when its slowest member does. The three games on this page turn these situations into the choice of a number.

What the game shows

Each of the three variants isolates a different idea. In the traveler's dilemma the equilibrium argument leads to an outcome that almost nobody finds sensible, so the game tests how far players follow a chain of undercutting. The 11–20 money request game was designed to count steps of reasoning with as little noise as possible. The minimum effort game has many equilibria that can be ranked from worst to best, and it tests whether a group can reach the best one when each member is unsure of the others.

The theory

In the traveler's dilemma of Basu (1994), both players receive the lower of the two claims, the lower claimant receives a reward in addition, and the higher claimant pays a penalty of the same size. Undercutting the other player by one unit is always profitable, and the argument unravels until both name the lowest number. That outcome is the unique Nash equilibrium for any reward larger than the smallest unit, however small the reward is in relation to the claims.

In the game of Arad and Rubinstein (2012), each player requests an amount between 11 and 20 and receives it, and a player who requests one less than the other receives a bonus of 20. Requesting 20 is the natural starting point, 19 is the best response to it, 18 the best response to 19, and so on. The game has no equilibrium in pure strategies, and in the mixed equilibrium players request 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20 with probabilities of 25, 25, 20, 15, 10 and 5 percent.

In the minimum effort game of Van Huyck, Battalio and Beil (1990), a player's payoff rises with the lowest effort in the group and falls with the player's own effort. Every effort level that all members choose in common is a Nash equilibrium. The highest is best for everybody, and the lowest is the only one that protects a player against a careless or cautious partner.

What to expect

Claims in the traveler's dilemma respond to the size of the reward, although the equilibrium does not. In the experiment of Capra et al. (1999), with claims between 80 and 200, average claims were close to the top of the range when the reward was small and fell toward the bottom when it was large. With the settings used here, a range of 2 to 100 and a reward of 2, most claims should be expected near 100.

In the basic version of the 11–20 game, Arad and Rubinstein (2012) found that 74 percent of participants requested 17, 18 or 19, which corresponds to one, two or three steps of reasoning. Six percent requested 20 and one in five requested 16 or less. The mixed equilibrium, by contrast, places half of its weight on 15 and 16.

In the minimum effort game the outcome is governed by the size of the group. In the large groups of 14 to 16 studied by Van Huyck, Battalio and Beil (1990), initial efforts were dispersed and the minimum fell rapidly to the lowest level. Fixed pairs, on the other hand, mostly reached the highest effort. Groups of four, the setting used here, lie between the two cases, and the direction in which a class of that size moves is a result worth discussing in itself.

Tips and things to look out for

References